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The contingent effects of environmental concern
and ideology: institutional context and people’s
willingness to pay environmental taxes
Dragana Davidovic, Niklas Harring and Sverker C. Jagers
Department of Political Science, Centre for Collective Action Research and the Quality of
Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden
ABSTRACT
Environmental taxes are often argued to be key to more effective environmental
protection. People’s willingness to pay such taxes in contexts with varying levels
of quality of government (QoG) is investigated. Applying multilevel analyses on
data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the QoG Institute,
links between environmental concern, ideology, and QoG are explored. The
results show that people who state that they are concerned about environmental
issues and live in high QoG countries are more willing than people in low QoG
countries to pay environmental taxes. Moreover, people in low QoG countries
holding leftist political value orientations are less willing to pay environmental
taxes than rightists and other value groups. Environmental concern and leftist
political ideology are more important drivers of public support for environmental
taxes in high QoG countries than in low QoG countries.
KEYWORDS Environmental taxes; willingness to pay; environmental concern; left-right ideology;
political trust; quality of government
Introduction1
Environmental problems such as climate change, pollution, and depletion
of common pool resources are commonly understood as being rooted in
social dilemmas and a lack of collective action. The rationale for this is that,
while each actor receives the benefits of their environmental pressure
individually, everyone shares the costs of polluting activities collectively,
resulting in a strong incentive for individuals to free-ride or to adopt
a defective behaviour (to benefit from reduced environmental pressures
undertaken by others, while personally refraining from cooperation for the
common good). Many environmental problems stem from situations where
the short-term benefits to individuals acting in an environmentally harmful
manner outweigh the long-term losses shared by everyone collectively,
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something that typically limits voluntary cooperative behaviour (Olson
1965, Dawes 1980, Ostrom 1990, Kollock 1998). Therefore, some kind of
third actor coordination is often necessary to overcome larger-scale envir-
onmental collective action problems. This coordination usually materializes
through a government using various forms of policy measures. Intervention
in people’s lives aimed at increasing collective action is more likely to
succeed if the citizenry supports this endeavour.
Studies on the explanatory factors of public support of environmental policy,2
or willingness to pay for environmental protection,3 have typically found that
people who value or care about the environment and who are generally con-
cerned about environmental issues (who have a pro-environmental value orienta-
tion), and people who are generally in favour of government intervention (who
have a leftist political value orientation), tend to be more supportive of environ-
mental policy measures (see, e.g. Stern et al. 1999, McCright et al. 2014).
However, research also shows that factors such as perceived presence of corrup-
tion and level of political and social trust influence people’s attitudes to state
intervention generally (e.g. Di Tella and MacCulloch 2009, Aghion et al. 2010,
Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. 2011, Pinotti 2011, Svallfors 2013) and to environmental
policy particularly (see, e.g. Clinch and Dunne 2006, Hammar and Jagers 2006,
Kallbekken and Sælen 2011, Harring 2013, 2014, 2016, Harring and Jagers 2013,
Kollmann and Reichl 2013).
The state can influence or change people’s actions and consumption pat-
terns in many different ways. Economists and policymakers have long pro-
moted market-based policy tools, such as taxes. There are a large number of
single country studies on support of and willingness to accept such tools;
extensive research exists on public support for green taxes conducted in
developed countries (e.g. Alm and Torgler 2006, Clinch and Dunne 2006,
Hammar and Jagers 2006, Konisky et al. 2008, Jagers and Hammar 2009,
Kallbekken and Sælen 2011, Harring and Jagers 2013, Harring 2014).
Comparative research has been rare, however (for exceptions, see Kollmann
and Reichl 2013, Harring 2014, 2016, Davidovic 2018, Harring et al. 2018).
Furthermore, previous research has, to our knowledge, not investigated poten-
tial interaction effects between individual- and contextual-level variables.
Investigating support for environmental protection,4 Fairbrother (2016) finds
that the effects of political and social trust vary cross-nationally,5 but does not
provide any explanations. Moreover, while he does test individual-level inter-
action effects between environmental concern and political trust and ideology
respectively, this does not involve any cross-level interactions. Just as the effects
of certain country-level factors can depend on other country-level character-
istics (Cf. Povitkina 2018),6 it is reasonable to believe that the effects of
individual-level factors on public support for green taxes depend on certain
country-level factors. Exploring public support for environmental taxes,
Davidovic (2018) finds an interaction effect between pro-environmental
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value orientation7 and quality of government (QoG) on environmental tax
support. However, this study uses a less sophisticated multilevel analysis
approach and does not explore interaction effects between left-right political
value orientations and QoG.
We investigate whether an interaction effect exists between people’s pro-
environmental and political value orientation and QoG on public support for
environmental taxes. QoG refers to the state’s capacity to perform its activities
in an efficient, fair, and impartial manner, and without corruption (Cf.
Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Specifically, we ask: are environmentally con-
cerned people equally willing to pay environmental taxes in all contexts, or is
this relationship contingent on the quality of government in the respective
country? We hypothesize that the effects of pro-environmental and political
value orientations vary cross-nationally and that varying levels of QoG can
explain this variation. If people lack trust in the capacity of public authorities to
implement environmental taxes in an effective, fair, and non-corrupt manner,
they are likely to be less supportive of, or willing to pay, these taxes despite their
pro-environmental value orientations. We apply the same reasoning to peo-
ple’s political value orientations and hypothesize that, in high QoG contexts,
people with leftist political value orientations have a higher willingness to pay
for environmental taxes than rightists and other value groups. In order to test
our hypotheses and thereby explain public support for green taxes interna-
tionally, we apply multilevel ordered logit regression analysis on data from the
International Social Survey Programme Environment III survey (ISSP
Research Group 2012) and the Quality of Government Basic Cross-Section
dataset (Teorell et al. 2012).
We organize the rest of our contribution as follows. Next, we provide
our theoretical framework, theoretical model, and hypotheses. Then we
present our methodological approach and discuss the data and operationa-
lization of variables, before giving the results of the analysis, which we then
analyze and relate to the hypotheses and theoretical model. We conclude by
revisiting our original research question and providing suggestions for
future research.
Theorizing public support for environmental taxes
Social dilemmas and pro-environmental policy measures
Upholding a clean and healthy environment is commonly considered
a collective good. However, the provision of such goods typically constitutes
a social dilemma with free-riding possibilities (Kollock 1998, Ostrom 1998).
This is because individuals generally choose not to cooperate, but instead
engage in activities that benefit themselves but harm the environment and
hence the collective, which, unavoidably, decreases the overall provision of
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the good. The larger the scale of the public good and the more actors
involved, the less likely it is that individuals will take voluntary actions to
protect the environment (Jagers et al. 2019). Even the voluntary actions that
some actors supposedly take (so-called unconditional cooperators) will be
inadequate, since they will undersupply pollution abatement if the indivi-
dual costs of such efforts exceed the benefits they and others enjoy
(Samuelson 1954, Gächter 2007). Therefore, to induce more actors to
undertake substantial efforts, organized coordination or sanctioning sys-
tems provided by a third, external party are needed. This external party is
usually the state (see Ostrom 1990, Mansbridge 2014).
However, this can generate a new collective action problem. If the sanctions
or costs of non-compliance and risks of detecting non-compliance (e.g. tax
evasion) are low, actors might tend to enjoy collective benefits while simulta-
neously ignoring the imposed regulation. From an individual actor’s perspec-
tive, costly abatement efforts are only meaningful when equivalent
contributions by other actors outweigh them, but such contributions are rarely
guaranteed. Thus, instead of participating in collective actions, by complying
with the policies, the involved parties tend to cheat, e.g., by violating costly
regulations or avoiding paying pollution taxes (Cf. Scholz and Lubell 1998).
Tax avoidance and failure of public institutions to collect taxes are generally
more severe in low QoG countries (Uslaner 2007). It is generally difficult for
people in high QoG countries to cheat on environmental taxes due to the ways
in which those states organize, implement, and enforce taxes. Therefore,
people in such countries are more likely to trust that others will comply with
imposed policies and that implementing authorities will provide something
good, e.g., by putting environmental tax revenues to their rightful use. This
should in turn translate into public support for green taxes (Kallbekken and
Sælen 2011; see also Carattini et al. 2019).
In contrast, people in low QoG countries, with low trust in implement-
ing institutions, are less likely to support higher environmental taxes,
primarily because they expect tax revenues to be wasted or stolen, through
corrupt practices, or even that the tax system has been designed with
loopholes allowing for tax evasion or unfair tax loading (Fairbrother 2016).
Pro-environmental and political value orientation, QoG, and
environmental policy support
There is a sociological and psychological literature asserting that people’s value
orientations explain their acceptance of environmental policy instruments.
These studies usually use either Schwartz’s value scheme (Schwartz 1992) or
Inglehart’s post-materialist values scale (Inglehart 1995) as their point of
departure, and they conclude that holding certain values (e.g., egoistic/altruis-
tic or materialist/post-materialist) creates certain beliefs about environmental
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conditions, affecting the formation of both general views and specific attitudes
to environmental policy tools, assuming that values affect people’s general
environmental concern and therefore their acceptance of pro-environmental
policies. Thus, environmental psychologists measure values and concerns
separately. Here, we use and define pro-environmental value orientation as
encompassing both, since ourmain interest is how environmentally concerned
people, who we assume have deeper ‘green’ values affecting their attitudes and
behaviour, react to environmental policy measures in different institutional
contexts. Hence, by measuring people’s concerns, we also indirectly capture
their pro-environmental values.
While previous research has used various scales to capture people’s values,
the applied measures do not necessarily capture people’s pro-environmental
value orientations. Moreover, research has shown that using only values
might be too limited in explaining environmental attitudes and behaviour
(Poortinga et al. 2004). We therefore focus on capturing people’s environ-
mental concerns, which are further down in the ‘causal chain’ between values
and pro-environmental policy support (Stern et al. 1999). Environmental
concern mediates the effect of values (Hansla et al. 2013), but environmental
concern can also result from people’s values; the reason people have pro-
environmental attitudes and concerns may be largely a result of their values.
Scholars have shown that values successfully explain environmental concern
(Schultz and Zelezny 1999, Franzen and Meyer 2010), which in turn has been
found to be a significant predictor of policy support for government regula-
tion and market-based policy tools (Poortinga et al. 2004).
We can also see environmental attitudes as being derived from people’s
political value orientations. That is, people’s ideological left-right positions
affect their attitudes to state involvement and regulation within the environ-
mental domain. Compared with their rightist counterparts, leftists are typi-
cally considered to be more supportive of environmental policies since they
are generally more positive toward government regulation and intervention.
In contrast, rightists generally prefer a free-market economy and are hence
less supportive of market-based environmental policy tools, but they are also
less prone to prioritizing environmental issues and concerns in general (e.g.
Dunlap and McCright 2008, Hinich et al. 2013, Liu et al. 2014, Hamilton and
Saito 2015, McCright et al. 2016). Most research on the effect of ideology on
support for environmental policy and environmental protection finds that
such support tends to be stronger among people who are more left-oriented
(e.g. Neumayer 2004, Konisky et al. 2008, McCright et al. 2014, Harring and
Jagers 2013, Hammar and Jagers 2006; see also Jagers et al. 2017a). However,
one recent study shows that right-oriented can be more supportive of
environmental protection than left-oriented individuals and that environ-
mental protection seems to be a political ideological issue in some countries
but not in others (Fairbrother 2016).
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The literature on comparative environmental opinion often neglects peo-
ple’s perceptions of the third actor (the state) and, specifically, the quality of the
state. An extensive political sociology literature elaborates on how political
trust and QoG affect public support for state intervention. Scholars argue that
people’s perceptions of public officials as non-corrupt, efficient, and fair
explain attitudes to redistribution, taxes, and government spending. For exam-
ple, Svallfors (2013) (see also Hetherington 1998, Scholz and Lubell 1998,
Rudolph and Evans 2005, Rothstein et al. 2012) finds that the perceived
effectiveness and fairness of government officials has a strong independent
effect on such attitudes. He shows that support for welfare and redistribution
policies is greater in high QoG countries, while people in low QoG societies do
not trust that public actors have the necessary capacity or bureaucratic discre-
tion to adequately implement policies or reforms (Svallfors 2013, see also
Dahlström et al. 2013). To some extent, research has confirmed these findings
within the environmental sphere, e.g., by showing that corrupt political insti-
tutions generate aversion to economic environmental policy tools (e.g.,
Harring 2014, 2016). In countries with corrupt and inefficient public institu-
tions, people generally exhibit a stronger demand for legal regulations than for
instruments based on economic transactions.
Additionally, when evaluating the effects of pro-environmental and political
value orientations and QoG on environmental policy support, the existing
literature has not looked at potential interactions. Following Fairbrother’s
(2016) and Davidovic’s (2018) recent findings, we argue that the effects of pro-
environmental and political value orientations on support for environmental
taxes may vary cross-nationally. In order to explain this variation, we consult
Svallfors (2013), who finds that the effect of people’s egalitarian values (their
belief in equality for all people, which characterizes people with leftist orienta-
tions) on public attitudes to higher taxes and government spending depends
on the perceived effectiveness and fairness of government institutions.
Svallfors shows that the effect of such values is stronger in high QoG countries,
and that, at low QoG levels, people with egalitarian values in some cases want
lower taxes than do people with less egalitarian values. People with egalitarian
values, who are usually supportive of welfare and distribution policies, are less
willing to support such policies if they live in low QoG societies. If the same
holds true for people’s pro-environmental and leftist political value orienta-
tions, we should expect the positive effect of such orientations on public
support for environmental taxes to be stronger in high QoG countries.
Theoretical model and hypotheses
Our theoretical discussion highlights the possibility that QoG may moderate
the effect of pro-environmental value orientation (environmental concern)
and political value orientation (left-right ideology) on public support for
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environmental taxes (willingness to pay environmental taxes). We also expect
QoG to have a direct effect on public support for environmental taxes. Figure 1
illustrates these relationships.
From our theoretical model, we derive the following hypotheses:
H1(A): Individuals holding pro-environmental value orientations are generally
more supportive of environmental taxes than individuals without such
orientations.
H1(B): Individuals holding leftist political value orientations are generally
more supportive of environmental taxes than individuals holding rightist or
other political value orientations.
H2: Individuals in high QoG countries are generally more supportive of
environmental taxes than individuals in low QoG countries.
H3(A): The positive effect of pro-environmental value orientations on public
support for environmental taxes is stronger in high QoG countries.
H3(B): The positive effect of leftist political value orientations on public
support for environmental taxes is stronger in high QoG countries.
Methodology, material, and measures
Data
To test our hypotheses, we use individual-level data from the ISSP Environment
III survey (ISSP Research Group 2012) covering 39,486 respondents from 30
countries.8 The ISSP collected the data in 2010 through self-completion
Figure 1. Theoretical model of environmental tax support.
Note: The model shows the moderating effect of QoG on the link between value orientations and
environmental tax support.
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questionnaires or face-to-face interviews, or both, using survey questions regard-
ing people’s environmental concerns and personal views on environmental
issues. We merged the ISSP dataset with country-level variables from the QoG
Basic Cross-Section Dataset (Teorell et al. 2012).
Operationalization of variables
Public support for environmental taxes
The dependent variable is public support for environmental taxes, measured in
the ISSP as: ‘Howwilling would you be to pay much higher taxes to protect the
environment?’, with responses ranging from ‘very unwilling’ (1) to ‘very will-
ing’ (5). As a robustness check, we also use the following measure with the
same response categories: ‘How willing would you be to pay much higher
prices in order to protect the environment?’ Both are useful proxies for policy
support, since willingness to pay is theminimum requirement for attaining any
public support for environmental taxes. However, the two measures are
problematic for several reasons. First, the reference to much higher taxes
(and prices) can be interpreted as an increase in the current tax levels in
general or in the existing levels of environmental taxes. Second, ‘much higher’
may also be difficult for respondents to grasp since we doubt that most citizens
know howmuch higher taxes should be in order to induce behavioural change.
We use the question to capture people’s willingness to pay environmental
taxes, i.e., whether such taxes are supported by citizens in various contexts as
policy tools to steer people’s behaviour in a pro-environmental direction.
Scholars have used these survey questions for many different purposes,
including to measure general support for environmental policies, willing-
ness to pay for environmental protection, and willingness to make eco-
nomic sacrifices for the environment. We believe that we can use them to
measure support for a certain type of government intervention, environ-
mental taxes specifically. While the first question captures attitudes to taxes
explicitly, the second does so implicitly since taxes usually result in higher
prices or fees. The questions are stated in a sense that captures the collective
action problem, or free-riding dilemma, of complying with an imposed
policy. We emphasize, however, that stated support for a policy does not
necessarily mean compliance in practice.
Pro-environmental value orientation
The literature assumes that people’s values affect their general environmental
concerns and, in turn, their acceptance of environmental policies. Here, we
measure pro-environmental value orientation – capturing general environ-
mental concern and, indirectly, values – using a question from the ISSP asking
for people’s general environmental concerns: ‘Generally speaking, how con-
cerned are you about environmental issues?’, with responses ranging from ‘not
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concerned at all’ (1) to ‘very concerned’ (5). Though somewhat vague, the
measure is clearly distinct from our dependent variable, since concern does not
automatically translate into willingness to take action or pay for environmental
protection (Cf. Fairbrother 2016).
Political value orientation
We measure political value orientation using country-specific survey ques-
tions from the ISSP concerning people’s political party affiliation. The ISSP
asked the respondents, for example, whether they consider themselves to be
close to any political party, what party they sympathize or identify with, and
which party they voted for in the last election. The ISSP then re-coded the
responses into a political party affiliation scale containing the following
steps: ‘far left,’ ‘left, center left,’ ‘center, liberal,’ ‘right, conservative,’ ‘far
right,’ ‘other,’ and ‘no party’. We transformed this scale into a dummy
variable where ‘far left’ and ‘left center left’ equal 1 and all others equal 0.
Political trust
Our main interest is whether people’s perceptions of implementing autho-
rities as efficient, fair, and uncorrupt – and whether policy instruments will
be handled accordingly – influences their support for environmental taxes.
A measure of political trust could partly capture this: ‘Most politicians are
in politics only for what they can get out of it personally,’ with responses
ranging from ‘agree strongly’ (1) to ‘disagree strongly’ (5). This measure of
trust in politicians captures trust in political representatives in general, and
scholars have shown that it is more strongly correlated with QoG than
measures of trust in government (Harring 2016). It also makes our measure
of support for environmental taxes less susceptible to the ideological posi-
tioning and level of environmentalism of governing political parties.
Quality of government
To capture the level of QoG in a country, we use the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) indicator of QoG, which consists of three variables:
‘Corruption,’ ‘Law and Order,’ and ‘Bureaucracy Quality.’9 This measure is
highly correlated with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) (Svensson 2005) and has been shown to produce results similar to
both the CPI and the World Bank Estimate of Government Efficiency. We
chose the ICRG indicator because we believe that its three dimensions best
capture the three dimensions of QoG that we argue are important for envir-
onmental tax support, namely perceptions of implementing authorities as
efficient (‘Bureaucracy Quality’), fair (‘Law and Order’), and non-corrupt
(‘Corruption’).
We can expect that, for citizens to accept economic instruments such as
environmental taxes they must possess a certain level of trust in both
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political institutions and institutions of law and order (Jones et al. 2009).
Trust in political institutions, including trust in the political system and that
those responsible for managing tax revenues (politicians) use them in an
effective and uncorrupt manner, will influence acceptance (‘Corruption’)
(cf. Kallbekken and Sælen 2011, Harring 2014), as will trust in institutions
of law and order responsible for external control mechanisms, that the legal
system treats citizens equally, and that citizens comply with public policies
(‘Law and Order’). The level of compliance with public policies by other
citizens (social trust) matters for acceptance and perceived effectiveness of
market-based policy instruments (Jones et al. 2009, Harring 2014).
Moreover, the level of strength and expertise of the bureaucracy, its
administrative capacity and bureaucratic discretion matters since actors
responsible for the implementation of environmental policy need to be
perceived as effective, operating with sufficient discretion in carrying out
policy (‘Bureaucracy Quality’) (Cf. Dahlström et al. 2013, Svallfors 2013,
Harring 2016). Previous public experiences of policy implementation might
influence policy acceptance as well (Jagers et al. 2017b), which should
depend on all three dimensions. We rescaled the variable from a 0–1 to
a 0–10 scale, where higher values mean higher QoG.
Controls
We include four control variables at the individual level: social trust (i.e., trust in
people one does not generally know), personal income, education, and gender.
Previous research has found all these variables to affect views on climate change
and public support for environmental protection and pro-environmental pol-
icy instruments (Shwom et al. 2015) (Appendix 1 – see SOM).We include three
control variables at the country level: economic development, economic inequal-
ity and environmental quality.10
We use real GDP per capita (2005) as a proxy for economic development.
Arguably, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of QoG and economic
development (which is beyond the scope of this study) when they are included
in the same models as our interaction terms (specifically when testing the
interaction between QoG and pro-environmental value orientation). It is,
however, problematic to exclude economic development from any analysis
dealing with environmental support, provided that economic development has
a positive effect on people’s support for the environment and ability to pay
higher taxes for environmental protection. In particular, it could be the case
that economic development (not QoG) explains the relationship between
people’s pro-environmental value orientation and their willingness to pay
environmental taxes, since with economic development come post-
materialist values such as environmental protection (Inglehart 1995) that affect
people’s environmental concern. Therefore, we include it in our analyses.
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Research has shown that economic inequality has a negative effect on public
attitudes to economic policy instruments (e.g., Harring 2014). A common per-
ception among the public is that environmental taxes will be unfair in the sense
that theywill affect low earnersmore than high earners, resulting in aversion.We
include a measure of economic inequality based on an income Gini coefficient
from the World Income Inequality Database of the World Institute for
Development Economics Research. The coefficient ranges from no income
differences at all (0) to a hypothetical situation where one person in a country
receives all the income (1). We altered the scale so that the country with the
highest economic inequality score in our sample equals 1 and the country with
the lowest economic inequality score equals 0. When controlling for income
inequality, we control not only for plausible negative effects of perceived unfair-
ness on people’s support for environmental taxes, but also for the fact that people
holding a certain political value orientation may object to higher taxes if they
worry more about income distribution than environmental protection.
Environmental quality is another variable we control for, given that the
current state of the environment may impact people’s demand for envir-
onmental policies. Accordingly, we use the Environmental Performance
Index, which consists of 24 indicators across ten different categories of
environmental health and ecosystem vitality and indicates how close
countries are to established environmental policy goals (Environmental
Performance Index 2018).
Method: multilevel regression analysis
In order to test our main hypothesis on interaction effects, we apply
multilevel ordered logit models to our two levels of analysis – individuals
and country context – to see if the individual effects of pro-environmental
value orientation (measured as environmental concern) and political value
orientation (measured as left-right ideology) are contingent on the coun-
try-level factor QoG. The intra-class correlation coefficient shows that
a substantial amount of the total variation in public support for environ-
mental taxes, about 5% in the sample, is between countries and is explic-
able by country-specific effects at the higher level. We are interested in
explaining this variation. Moreover, if these country-specific effects are
ignored, there is an apparent risk that estimated regression parameters
and standard errors will be biased (Guo and Zhao 2000), most likely
generating underestimated standard errors and overestimated significance
levels (Allison 2009).
The advantage of using multilevel analysis is that we can allow regression
parameters to vary, allowing us to assume that countries have different starting
points in the level of support for environmental taxes (random intercepts) and
that the effects of different predictors (pro-environmental and political value
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orientations) might vary cross-nationally (random slopes). To model the latter
variation, we use interaction terms in the multilevel models to explain these
varying effects.
Results
Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel ordered logit regression
analysis using willingness to pay much higher taxes for environmental
protection as our dependent variable (see Appendix 2 in SOM for the
results using willingness to pay much higher prices for environmental
protection as dependent variable). Table 1 shows results with all level 1
predictors group-mean centered around country means. We exclude results
with group means at level 2 for each group-mean centered level 1 variable,
since including the group means did not change our parameter estimates
significantly (see Appendices 3 and 4 – see SOM).
As predicted, we find that pro-environmental value orientation is a highly
significant predictor of environmental tax support (measured as willingness to
pay much higher taxes for environmental protection). The more concerned
people are about environmental issues, the more likely they are to be willing to
pay higher taxes for environmental protection (.37***). We also find that
political value orientation is a highly significant predictor of support for
environmental taxes. People who place themselves more to the left on the left-
right scale are more likely to be willing to pay higher taxes for environmental
protection (.29***). As for our other main variable of interest, we observe that
country-level QoG is associated with stronger support for environmental taxes
(.15***).11 Figure 2 illustrates the correlation between QoG and environmental
tax support. It shows that, on average, people are less willing to pay much
higher taxes for environmental protection in countries with low levels of QoG.
In Models 2 and 3, we introduce individual-level interaction terms
(pro-environmental value orientation*political trust and left political
value orientation*political trust, respectively), but find no statistically
significant interaction effects. In Models 4 and 5, however, where we
introduce cross-level interaction terms, we find statistically significant
interactions. In Model 4, we find a cross-level interaction term (pro-
environmental value orientation*QoG) that is positive and statistically
significant (.03***), meaning that as the level of QoG increases, so does
the likelihood of environmentally concerned individuals being more sup-
portive of environmental taxes. In Model 5, we observe that the other
cross-level interaction term (leftist political value orientation*QoG) is
positive and statistically significant (.08***), showing that leftists are
more likely than other political value groups to be willing to pay much
higher taxes for environmental protection at higher levels of QoG.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































model, meaning that people with leftist political value orientations are less
willing to pay much higher taxes for environmental protection than right-
ists and other value groups in low QoG countries.
Figure 3 illustrates the interaction effect between pro-environmental
value orientation and QoG. More specifically, it shows the marginal effects
of being ‘environmentally concerned’ and ‘less environmentally concerned’
on willingness to pay environmental taxes.
Figure 4 shows the interaction effect between ideological positioning and
QoG. More specifically, it shows the predicted probabilities of individuals to
the ‘left’ and ‘all others’ being ‘fairly unwilling’ and ‘fairly willing’ to pay for
environmental taxes at different levels of QoG, respectively.
We also find significant effects of our individual-level control variables.
People with higher incomes, higher social trust, more education, and men,
are more likely to be supportive of environmental taxes. None of our
country-level control variables turns out to be significant. More impor-
tantly, the effects of both QoG and political trust are quite modest.
Analysis
Unsurprisingly, we find that people with strong pro-environmental value
orientations are more likely to be supportive of environmental taxes. We
Figure 2. Quality of government and willingness to pay for environmental taxes.
Comment: The graph shows the mean willingness to pay much higher taxes for environmental
protection by country across different levels of QoG. Source: ISSP – Environment III 2010 and QoG
Basic Cross-Section Dataset 2012.
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also find that people holding leftist value orientations are more likely than
others to support environmental taxes. Hence, we cannot reject the first
hypothesis (H1A and H1B). Our results show that QoG has a positive effect
on people’s willingness to pay environmental taxes. Thus, the data also
suggest that we cannot reject our second hypothesis (H2).
Regarding the interaction effect between pro-environmental value orienta-
tion and QoG (H3A), one of our main contributions, we find that environmen-
tally concerned people are more willing to pay environmental taxes if they live
Figure 3. Marginal effect of environmental concern on willingness to pay for environ-
mental taxes at different levels of QoG.
Comment: 95% confidence intervals. The graphs show the predicted probabilities for the two cate-
gories ‘Fairly unwilling’ and ‘Fairly willing’. The regressions are multilevel ordered logit models similar
to Model 4 presented in Table 1, except that environmental concern (group-mean centered) is divided
into two subcategories based on the mean value of environmental concern in each country. The ones
above the mean are categorized as ‘Environmentally concerned’ and the ones below as ‘Less envir-
onmentally concerned.’ Source: ISSP – Environment III 2010 and QoG Basic Cross-Section Dataset 2012.
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of ideological position on willingness to pay for
environmental taxes at different levels of QoG.
Comment: 95% confidence intervals. The graphs show the predicted probabilities for the two categories
‘Fairly unwilling’ and ‘Fairly willing’. The regressions are multilevel ordered logit models similar to Model
5 presented in Table 1. Source: ISSP – Environment III 2010 and QoG Basic Cross-Section Dataset 2012.
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in high QoG countries (see Figure 3). Similarly, we find a significant interac-
tion effect between leftist political value orientation and QoG (H3B). People
who are generally in favour of government regulation and steering, are more
likely to support environmental taxes if they live in high QoG countries (see
Figure 4). At low levels of QoG, leftists are in fact less supportive of taxes than
other value groups (see Model 5 in Table 1). Hence, the data suggest that we
cannot reject our third hypothesis (H3A and H3B).
These results are similar to those of Svallfors (2013) on the effect of
egalitarian values on public support for higher taxes and welfare spending,
and suggest that a similar theoretical reasoning is applicable in the environ-
mental domain. People with leftist value orientations living in low QoG
societies are generally not willing to support higher taxes for environmental
protection, while people with ‘green’ value orientations are more likely to do so
if they live in high QoG societies. We can explain these results as follows:
although people with pro-environmental and leftist value orientations are
supportive of environmental taxes, they are even more eager not to support
and provide corrupt, inefficient, and untrustworthy public institutions with
additional financial resources that may end up being used for environmentally
detrimental rather than environmentally protective purposes.
Fairbrother’s (2016) conclusion that political trust is not what ‘con-
verts’ environmental concern into support for environmental protection
appears to be validated by our study. We find no significant individual-
level interaction effect between environmental concern and political trust
(Model 2 in Table 1), and when interpreting the coefficient of environ-
mental concern in the model with the interaction term between QoG
and pro-environmental value orientation (Model 4 in Table 1), environ-
mental concern appears to have a positive effect on willingness to pay
for environmental taxes even at low levels of QoG. While Fairbrother
finds no significant interaction effects between individuals’ political trust
and neither environmental concern nor party identification, we find that
QoG conditions the effects of environmental concern and left-right
ideology on environmental policy support.
The significant interaction effects between QoG and environmental
concern and left ideology, respectively, support our theoretical proposition
that people’s perceptions of government authorities as efficient, uncorrupt,
and fair, or trustworthy, influence their willingness to pay higher taxes for
environmental protection. While QoG, political trust, environmental con-
cern, and left ideology separately influence and all have positive effects on
public support for environmental taxes, the effects of environmental con-
cern and left ideology are stronger when the level of QoG is higher. In fact,
the effect of left ideology on environmental tax support is negative at low
levels of QoG. However, it is important to emphasize that the moderating
effect of QoG is quite modest.
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Conclusion
Our aimwas to investigate potential interaction effects between individual- and
country-level variables to explain public support (measured as willingness to
pay) for environmental taxes internationally. We asked the following research
question: Are environmentally concerned people equally willing to pay environ-
mental taxes in all contexts, or is this relationship contingent on the quality of
government in the respective country? We found that QoG is a statistically
significant moderator of the relationship between public support for green
taxes and environmental concern and leftist ideology, respectively. Therefore,
our results support the proposition that the effects of pro-environmental and
political value orientations depend on country context. Specifically, the institu-
tional context, or the quality of the third party, seems to matter. The results
indicate that environmental concern and leftist political ideology are more
important for generating public support for environmental taxes in high
QoG countries than in low QoG countries.
To make environmental taxes a suitable solution across diverse coun-
try contexts, particularly in developing countries, where tax evasion is
likely and often acceptable among the public, building higher QoG and
trust in implementing authorities seems crucial. The main challenge in
developed countries is how to induce action on global environmental
issues and not so much about changing people’s orientations – environ-
mental concern is not what is lacking. In less developed or emerging
economies, implementing environmental taxes might not be the first
priority ahead of other developmental goals. Here, effective implementa-
tion is also likely to be obstructed by non-compliance, considering
weaker enforcement abilities and the greater risks of tax evasion. Thus,
taxes are perhaps not always the best solution to collective action pro-
blems. Until people are willing to accept and actually pay higher taxes for
environmental protection in practice, and public aversion is much lower
than public support, other environmental policy tools, such as strict legal
instruments might be more attractive and effective in changing people’s
environmentally unfriendly behaviour.
As in previous research, we are not able to explain all country-level
variation in willingness to pay environmental taxes. However, we have been
able to identify at least one country-level variable that contributes to this end:
QoG. We add to previous research findings on the importance of QoG in
explaining public preferences regarding environmental policies and show that
QoG requires more attention since it also plays a role in moderating the
effects of individual-level factors. Further research on the interactions
explored here is needed to bring deeper knowledge of the exact interactions.
Using other datasets and better measures could confirm or disentangle the
proper interaction effects. We encourage scholars to explore these and other
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possible interactions, also using other methodological approaches. For exam-
ple, survey experiments might explore whether the moderating effect of QoG
on values goes via political trust or some other factor. Also, looking at other
environmental policy tools, in a similar way as willingness to pay for green
taxes was explored in this study, can bring more insights into public support
for environmental policies generally.
Notes
1. For Appendices, see Supplementary Online Material.
2. For an overview of the explanatory factors of climate policy support, see
Drews and Van Den Bergh (2016).
3. We use support and acceptance of environmental policy and environmental
taxes interchangeably. They are defined in terms of attitudes, and we measure
attitudes to environmental taxes specifically.
4. Measured as willingness to pay higher taxes and prices for environmental
protection – the same measures we use to capture environmental tax support.
5. He does, however, show that the effects of social and political trust on the
willingness to pay for environmental protection are quite consistent cross-
nationally compared with the effect of party identification.
6. Povitkina (2018) tests whether the association between level of democracy
and CO2 emissions is moderated by, or conditional on, the level of corrup-
tion in a country and finds that higher levels of democracy is only associated
with lower CO2 emissions in low-corrupt contexts. These results indicate that
corruption may obscure effective implementation of climate policies, of
which environmental taxes are on example.
7. Measured as post-materialist values.
8. For a complete list of countries included in our analysis (and sampling
details), see Appendix 5 in SOM.
9. Corruption measures corruption within the political system. Law and Order are
sub-components measuring the strength and impartiality of the legal system
and popular observance of the law, respectively. Bureaucracy Quality measures
the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy to govern without interruptions in
government services or drastic changes in policy. Scores on the ICRG index
indicate the mean value of these three variables (Svallfors 2013).
10. We chose not to include a control for current tax level, partly because it is
correlated with and to some extent endogenous to our main variable of
interest (QoG), but also because, when we included it in our models, its
effect was statistically insignificant. It also substantially reduced the number
of observations in our analyses.
11. When the group means of all level 1 predictors are included, QoG is
significant at the 95% level (0.11*).
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